

00527

1962/10/19

(339)

51

CUT-711

10/19 - 11:2 AM

all including Dean Carlson, Kish, Ball, Johnson, Thompson, Merkin

Review by Sundahl -

28 - numbers

28 - SAMs

35 - May 21 ± +4 probables

note asked if we had it all
McCune said not all - maybe
30% - or doubles or triple

Oliver reviewed estimate - appendix
and some - gain NPTC etc.

Exchange of opinion of Appendix
Conclusion limited action
results were reevaluation then
also summary

Keynote remarks - Sov assistance
policy defensive - help industry
- help agriculture
Note of water on this

Katzenbach - No problems in
establishing blockade except
difficultly negotiations OAS
and taking to U.N. Pres needs
no more authority - Declaration
was not necessary and
contrary to Int. Law and
U.N. charter

F

No classification indicated

CIA, JF 80801285A,

Box 6,

DCI Meeting with
the President, + [unclear]

10/21 - 30 June 1962

1402 - 31 [unclear] 10/62

174

ST/Sm/14

CU 432

2) Need to justify action on
 reason other than attack or danger
 of attack - U.N. GA action
 unavoidable - Under O.A.S. and UN
 Convention we cannot use force
 Argument of special region of law
 in W.S. West Hem. Given U.S.
 special privilege - This will
 not stand up. To make our
 action legal must have action
 under art. 6 & 8 of O.A.S. Treaty
 Martin lectures we could get
 14 votes easily. This would
 leave any use of force -
 action. In discussion we are
 a little bit behind steps to
 stop more coming in we will
 not get away from and
 members would be instructed
 if larger steps are to get
 approval of 6. coming from
 them we should not get
 approval but action does
 not decide. This necessary
 and the same abnormal
 association of two bodies.

CIA, JF 80801285A,
 Box 61
 DCI Meeting with
 the President, 1 December
 1961 - 30 June 1962

274

111-433

3) Wilson supports a

Read note for summary of last night meeting 11/10/61 - expanded in 3 courses

- 1 - Political
- 2 - Sanitized blockade which may be considered
- 3 - Full strike I-II-III plus threat to quarantine (300-400 sorties)

For tentative decision (2)

Decision TV Sunday - action on Monday & Tuesday - Bundy says not sure of Pres state of mind - Told full Pres the AM - Not sure how well if we did not offer more than one course of action -

Taylor - JCS strongly favor military action - Strike against all known installations in difficulties of blockade and surveillance
Quarantaine

CIA, JF 80801/285A,
Box 6,
DCI Meeting with
the President, 1 December
1961 - 30 June 1962

3 of 4

CVI-71/4

CVII-7114

4) AG - eliminates plans to
has arguments for 2 and 3
Feels Pres. will have different
time attacking Cuba 6 M/180 M
some great moral problems
and relationship with other
countries. ICBs in USSR are
just as dangerous as missile
in Cuba - OK to make both
scenarios but final decision
most difficult.

Thompson favors blockade but
feels it will escalate - Gromyko
feels we will have blow down
and we must choose best time
killing 5000 in Cuba means possible
Others when we get into a
standdown we see danger
of nuclear war and if we
lose this then we will see
loss of Latin America - Do
we know Castro will not
someday have these missiles
Blockade will not require
missiles - therefore they
will become operational
and we can name again act -

"Declassified for Publication in
Foreign Relations of the United States"

CIA, JF 80801285A,
Box 61
DCI Meeting with
the President, 1 December
1961 - 30 June 1962

484

CU 43